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position of each of their managers and the content of the problems the managers identified in an ill-structured decision situation. The present research extended that effort by recording the entire work history for each manager studied, by assessing the content of each individual's belief structure, and by noting the effects of that belief structure not only on problem identification, but also on use of information and requests for additional information. With actual measures of the managers' belief structures, it was possible to examine just how selective their perception was.
RESEARCH ISSUES The Content of the Managers' Belief Structures
Individuals hold many different belief structures about many different information domains. In order to examine the effects of a belief structure on managerial information processing, its broad content must be established. The research task is to select and assess a type of belief structure relevant to the information-processing task at hand. It seems likely that managers hold belief structures organized around attributes they believe characterize a successful organization. Although Dearborn and Simon (1958) did not speculate about the nature of each manager's hypothesized viewpoint, it is reasonable to argue that exposure to a department's goals and activities is likely to shape a manager's conception of organizational success. The observations of a number of theorists support that hypothesis. Srivastva, for example, argued that managers mentally create "an image of a desired future organizational state that can serve as a guide to interim strategies, decisions, and behavior" (1983: 2). Quinn asserted that "managers keep a clear vision in mind of where they would like to go and use all the valid analytical data they can as they guide their organizations toward a new strategy" (1980: 192). Dearborn and Simon's (1958) logic of departmental identification suggests that such visions may be organized by function in managers' minds.
Examining managers' belief structures concerning the characteristics of a successful organization finds theoretical precedent in Cohen's (1981) notion of a judgment goal. In her review of the literature, she found support for the proposition that peoples' goal orientations shape their definition of an information domain and guide information processing with respect to it. I assumed that managers attend to stimuli as they relate to their notions of organizational success, which in this research served as their judgment goal.
Hypotheses
The cornerstone of Dearborn and Simon's (1958) argument is that by virtue of the time spent in a particular department or function, managers develop a viewpoint that is consistent with the activities and goals of that department or particular function. Their logic is based on a simple exposure effect: exposure to the activities and goals of a department fosters a readiness in individuals to view their broader organizational worlds in a special light.
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Thus, managers' functional work histories are likely to be represented in the specific content of their belief structures.
Hypothesis 1: A manager with a belief structure focused on a single functional donmain is likely to have worked in that domain.
The predicted information-processing effects of holding a particular belief structure are straightforward. Given that belief structures define individuals' domains of attention (Cohen & Ebbesen, 1979) 
METHODS
Respondents and Procedures
The data for this study were collected from 121 midcareer managers enrolled in a two-year, part-time executive master's degree program at a large university. These individuals were either middle-level managers who were recognized by their employing organization as having senior-management potential or senior-level managers seeking to improve their management skills. The average respondent was 38 years old. Of the 121 individuals, 91 were men and 30 were women. At the time of data collection (1983), 97 of the respondents earned less than $50,000 per year and 24 earned more.
The director of the degree program informed the approximately 240 enrollees of the opportunity to take part voluntarily in a "research project on managerial decision making." Groups of no more than 30 individuals were asked to report to a large classroom at a prearranged time. They completed a sorting task and a case analysis.
Sorting task. Each manager was given a randomly ordered deck of 50 three-by-five-inch cards. Each card was labeled with one of 50 factors thought to be broadly related to the success of organizations. The factors were drawn from among Hambrick's (1981) functional areas, Miles's (1980) strategic constituencies, and the Profit Impact of Market Strategies variables (PIMS; Buzzell, Gale, & Sultan, 1975) . The intent of this research-based selection procedure was to create a pool of items that might reasonably encompass all the managers' notions of organizational success. Moreover, I chose items that might represent the kind of departmental bias that Dearborn and Simon (1958) inferred existed. Although items such as "working hard" or "perseverence" may be suitable for investigation in another context, they would not enable assessment of departmental identification. Table 1 lists the items that were presented to the managers.
The managers were instructed to sort through the deck of cards to create two piles-one containing the factors that they thouglht were important to (2) to indicate what additional information they would need to assess the company's situation thoroughly. At the conclusion of the session, the managers were debriefed about the nature of the project and asked not to discuss their experience with others.
Measurements
Belief structures. The use of a sorting procedure to measure belief structures was borrowed from personality research. Rosenberg (1982) reviewed sorting methodology, which is demonstrated by the sorting procedure described in the previous section, and its application to psychological research, tracing that history back to Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (1956). Such a procedure has three strengths: (1) It allows subjects to categorize a set of stimuli that are independent of an experimenter's own category system. (2) The output of the sorting procedure can be used as input for a number of multivariate analytic techniques, including multidimensional scaling. (3) It is a less cumbersome technique for estimating psychological distance between objects than Torgerson's (1958) method, which requires subjects to rate all pairwise similarities in a stimulus set. In this study, there were 50 stimuli in the set. Ilad the managers been asked to rate all pairwise similarities, they would have had to make 1, Problem identification. The method employed here was similar to the one used by Dearborn and Simon (1958) . In their study, managers with diverse backgrounds were asked to read a case and then write a brief description of what they considered to be the most important problem facing the company. I asked the managers in this research to identify the most important problem or problems facing the Arbor Company. The managers' responses were coded into five categories: accounting-finance, human relations, marketing, internal management, and external management. Dearborn and Simon classified their managers' responses into a set of only three departmental categories: sales, production, and accounting. In this research, the accounting-finance and marketing categories captured the function-specific information relevant to each domain. The human relations category encompassed such factors as the age and job tenure of particular managers and such issues as recruiting and turnover patterns. Internal management referred to problems related to timely and appropriate decision making on matters of intraorganizational concern. It captured the action orientation of the hypothetical management in the case. External management captured the same action orientation but focused on organization-environment issues. The internal and external management categories were added to the traditional functional categories to address scholarly interest in such orientations (Pearce, 1983) .
Two research assistants were hired and trained to code the open-ended responses to the case analysis using the classification scheme just described. Each assistant coded all 121 cases on her own, and then the two met to resolve any differences and to reach an overall agreement for each respondent. Table 2 Information use. Information use was measured as follows: managers were asked to underline any information in the case that was useful to them in identifying the problems facing the Arbor Company. The underlined information was coded as falling into one of the five areas identified in the preceding section. Each sentence in the case contained information that might be relevant to any of the five categories, so that as managers underlined case information that they considered diagnostically relevant, they were underlying information that fell into one or more of five coding categories. The information-use measure is simply the number of times a respondent underlined information contained in each of the five categories.1 Since this coding procedure was an unambiguous mechanical task, one person coded the data.
Requests for additional information. Managers were also asked what additional information they would need in order to assess the Arbor Company's situation thoroughly. Following the same procedure used in the problem identification coding, the two research assistants coded responses to this open-ended question into the five areas. Table 2 presents the interrater reliability indexes for the coding results, again using the proportion of requests in each category as input for the correlations. All the correlations are large and highly significant and again allow confidence in the reliability of the measurement.
RESULTS
The Content of the Managers' Belief Structures
To identify the content of the managers' belief structures, I employed individual differences multidimensional scaling. As Schiffman, Reynolds, and Young noted, multidimensional scaling "recovers underlying structure among stimuli which is 'hidden' in the data" (1981: 7). I used the individual differences scaling algorithm developed by Carroll and Chang (1970) If a respondent underlined information within the first bracket, he or she was coded as attending to human relations issues. Underlining in the second bracket was coded as attention to internal management concerns. The remaining brackets captured external management, marketing, marketing, and accounting-finance issues, respectively. The case and coding scheme are available from the author upon request. A ten-dimensional solution best fit the data in the aggregate, the belief structure representative of all the managers studied can be identified with this set of ten common dimensions. Such a solution is known as a group trait space, which represents a common set of dimensions along which individuals are thought to perceive stimuli. It is important to remember that the weight given to each dimension varies across individuals.
The solution accounted for 30 percent of the variance.
It might be helpful to explain what a variance-explained statistic means in the context of multidimensional scaling. The sorting procedure established dissimilarity judgments among all the items in the stimulus set. Distances among those items were then estimated. Any IDSORT scaling solution would have defined precise distances among the items. The program passes repeatedly through various solutions to determine the one in which the distances among the items best match the distances estimated from the original dissimilarity judgments. The variance-explained statistic emibodies the degree to which the interitem distances in the final IDSORT solution and the interitem distances estimated from the original dissimilarity judgments are similar, assessing the quality of this match. The 30 percent of variance explained in this research is generally consistent with typical individualdifferences scaling results. For example, the values for variance explained in the solutions reported by Passer, Kelley, and Michela (1978), Takane (1982b) , and Wish, Deutsch, and Biener (1972) were 35, 41, and 22 percent, respectively. Table 3 shows the eigenvalues, scaling solutions, and loadings for each of the ten dimensions. Clusters of stimuli anchor the ends of each dimensions and thus define it. For example, dimension 5 is clearly marketing oriented. The polar opposite clusters labeled product development and product delivery indicate that managers think of marketing at least partially in terms of developing and delivering products to the marketplace. Similarly, each of the clusters of stimuli define the emergent perceptual dimensions that compose organizational success in the minds of these managers. As the table shows, I gave summary labels to each of the clusters.
Some of the factors load on more than one dimension and, as a result, some dimensions appear to overlap. Such results are common in attempts to represent complex information domains (Smith & Siegel, 1967) . Dimensions 4 and 5, for example, share some marketing factors, which reflects the fact that in the respondents' minds, marketing issues such as market share, market growth rate, and sales force management are related to internal product development as well as to external environment. Similarly-, the first four dimensions reflect the perception that an external orientation, related to each of four distinct internal concerns, is important to organizational success. The overlaps were not problematic for carrying out the remainder of the analyses.
An examination of the individual weights for each of the ten dimensions in the group trait space indicated how the managers differed in their views of organizational success, allowing assessment of Dearborn and Simon's (1958) hypothetical construct, the viewpoint. It was possible to determine who viewed organizational success along narrow functional lines. For example, the belief structure of a manager who gave a very high weight to dimension 3 and perhaps 6 and low weights to the other eight dimensions was dominated by financial concerns. A human-relations-oriented belief structure would have dimensions 1 and perhaps 8 weighted heavily; a marketing-oriented belief structure would evidence high weight on dimension 4 and perhaps 5 or 7; a manufacturing-oriented belief structure would show high weight on dimension 9 and perhaps 5 or 7; a leadership-oriented belief structure would be marked by high weights on dimensions 2 or 10 and perhaps 6 or 8; and finally, a generalist, a manager whose orientation to organizational success is not narrow and functionally specific, would have high weights on dimensions that crossed any of these five boundaries.
With .60 taken as the threshold for a high individual weight, the breakdown of managerial belief structures by type was as follows: 
Belief-structure Origins
The Appendix reports the job titles and work experience of all the managers in the five pure-type belief-structure groups (human relations, accountingfinance, marketing, leadership, and manufacturing). Contrary to what might be expected from Dearborn and Simon's results, no simple link emerged between work experience and the content of belief structures. To be sure, all the managers in the human relations group either worked in the personnel function or managed employees, and four of the seven managers in the marketing group had spent their entire careers in marketing. Nevertheless, there were enough anomalies in this qualitative analysis to suggest that the results did not replicate those of Dearborn and Simon.
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A t-test compared the functional diversity statistic (described in the Measurements section above) for managers in the pure-type groups with the diversity statistic of the generalists. Hypothesis 1 predicted that the generalists (mean = 85.3; N = 55) would show more functionally diverse work experience than their peers in the pure-type groups (mean = 87.2; N = 25). Although the means are in the predicted direction, the difference is not statistically significant, so the data do not support Hypothesis 1.
The Effects of Belief Structures on Information Processing
To test the effects of the content of belief structures on information processing, I examined the responses of managers in four of the content groups: human relatioris, accounting-finance, marketing, and generalists. The leadership and manufacturing groups were dropped from the analysis because they were very small. Table 4 presents the means and standard deviations for the three information-processing variables by the four content groups and the results of the analyses of variance testing the effects of content-group membership on the information-processing variables. Although it is not noted explicitly in Table 4 , on the average managers identified 7.12 problems facing the Arbor Company, using 25.09 pieces of data in the case to arrive at this diagnosis, and requested an average 4.63 pieces of additional information to supplement their assessments. Thus, the average manager does not emerge as a parochial information processor.
In the study's test of Hypothesis 2, the four belief-structure content groups served as independent variables for a series of one-way ANOVAs testing for differences on the number of problems identified in each of the five areas of management. The four groups differed only with respect to identifying external management problems. A multiple range test using the least-significant difference (LSD) procedure established that the marketing group saw more external management problems (means = 2.57) than the human relations group (mean = 1.55) and the generalist group (mean = 1.74) at the .05 level of significance. These results offer some marginal support for Hypothesis 2.
A similar set of one-way ANOVAs was performed to test the hypothesis that the content groups would only use information from the same domain as their belief structures' content. As there were no significant differences between the four groups on their use of information in the case, Hypothesis 3 was not supported.
Hypothesis 4, which stated that managers would search for additional information that was from the same domain as their belief structures' content, received limited support in this investigation. ANOVAs were performed to test for differences in additional information requests within each of the four groups. Multiple range tests established that the accounting-finance group requested more accounting-finance information (mean = 1.67) than the marketing group (mean = .33), the human relations group (mean = .73), and the generalist group (mean = .86) at the .05 level of significance. Additionally, the marketing group requested more external management information (mean = 2.50) than the human relations group (mean = 1.00) and the generalist group (mean = 1.09) at the .01 level of significance. Finally, a more narrowly focused MANOVA was performed to test Dearborn and Simon's (1958) hypothesized departmental viewpoint effect on problem identification. Results for the effects of belief-structure content on problem identification within the information domnains of human relations, accounting/finance, and marketing were not significant.
DISCUSSION
Organizational scholars have widely assumed that the belief structures managers use to deal with ill-structured problems, however necessary, have detrimental effects on their decision making. The results of this research on managerial information processing challenge that assumption. Although the managers studied were not asked to make actual decisions, the belief structures they brought to bear on the problems in this study were not particularly simplistic. Moreover, the dominant dimensions of their belief structures did not appear to significantly constrain their information processing. These managers did not seem to suffer from impoverished worldviews or parochial information use.
One goal of this research was to identify managerial belief structures empirically. Contrary to what Dearborn and Simion reported 30 years ago, few managers viewed their organizational worlds along narrow functional criteria. Three-quarters of this group either had strong conceptions of success that crossed functional lines or had no firmly held dominant conceptionl of success. The selectivity of managers' perceptions may not be as constrained as Dearborn and Simon (1958) thought.
Axelrod (1976) concluded from his work that decision makers may hold more beliefs than they can handle. These results both support and challenge his conclusion. Managers may view organizational success on as many as ten dimensions. That finding supports Cyert and March (1963), Posner and Schmidt (1984) , and Stagner (1969), all of whom argued that managers are concerned with a number of goals beyond simple profit maximization. However, among managers holding one or more dimensions of organizational success as very important, the average number of dimensions held to be important was only 2.34. What was the status of the other, lesser-weighted 7.66 dimensions? Are they the implicit beliefs that Axelrod felt decision makers should work to uncover? Or are they somehow less valued but nevertheless available for use if the occasion arises? Given the broad scope of information processing evident in these results, it would seem that the less important dimensions that cover the full ten-dimensional conceptual terrain of organizational success are available for use.
The lack of a strong correspondence between work experiences and the content of belief structures is intriguing. Hypothesis 1 would suggest that Academy of Managemnent Journal December managers with a strong functional-area orientation within their belief structure would be working in that same area. However, in this research a chief financial officer, a vice president of marketing, and an assistant director of finiance all shared a human relations belief structure. Similarly, there was a chief financial officer with a manufacturing belief structure, an assistant marketing manager with an accounting-finance belief structure, and a supervisory engineer with a marketing belief structure. Perhaps these managers are in the wrong jobs or work in companies with strong cultures that have supplanted the traditional functional orientations of their jobs; perhaps they have been exposed to a number of functional areas during their careers or have been paying close attention in their executive development classes. Nevertheless, it is entirely reasonable to imagine that a chief financial officer, for example, knows something about human resource management or might even feel that such practices are critical to organizational success, even if he or she has never worked in a personnel department. The most striking finding to emerge from this research was the general lack of support for Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4. There was little evidence of parochial information processing. As Table 4 indicates, the average manager was able to identify problems and use information across the five domains. This is not to say that there was no support for the information-processing hypotheses, for some support emerged. Managers with a marketing belief structure identified more external management problems and requested more external management information than managers in the human relations and generalist groups, and the accounting-finance group sought out more accounting and finance information than the other groups. Nevertheless, even as those groups attended, and perhaps overattended, to their own areas of concern, they did not overlook the other domains. The marketing group identified 2.57 external management problems and also identified 6.14 other problems. Similarly, the accounting-finance group requested 1.67 pieces of additional accounting-finance information and also requested 5.67 pieces of additional information outside that domain. Perhaps those findings reflect the influence of the lesser-weighted belief-structure dimensions on information processing? Although the managers may not see those dimensions as of paramount importance to success, the evidence suggests that if an illstructured problem triggers a concern in those areas, an executive decision maker may be able to employ them.
An Explicit Comparison with Dearborn and Simon
Since the results of this investigation appear to contrast sharply with the often-cited results of Dearborn and Simon's (1958) study, it is important to take note of the -explicit similarities and differences between the two. Respondents, procedures, and results can be meaningfully compared.
The respondents in Dearborn and Simon's research were 23 mliddle managers, representing a single manufacturing company, who were attending a company-sponsored executive training program. This research included 121 middle-to upper-level managers, representing a variety of companies, who were attending a university-based executive master's degree program. The major differences, then, were the group sizes and the numbers of companies represented in each group. The present research benefited from greater diversity. The two groups were roughly equivalent in terms of occupational responsibility and interest in executive development. Unfortunately, we cannot compare the scope of educational experiences between the two.
The procedures employed in the two studies differed somewhat. First, the length of the cases varied. Although both cases were descriptive, not evaluative, the case in this research was about 1,000 words in length; the Castengo Steel Company case employed by Dearborn and Simon was about 10,000 words long. It is possible that managers can be more rigorous in their analysis of a short case. Second, Dearborn and Simon's managers were only asked to define the most important problem facing the company-although some defined as many as three problems. In contrast, the managers in the present study were asked to identify one or more problems facing the company, to sbare the information they used in this diagnosis, and to indicate what additional information they would need to be certain of their diagnosis. Thus, the present research offers a better assessment of information processing. In sum, Dearborn and Simon collected a small amount of information-processing evidence from the analysis of a fairly rich case, and the managers in this study provided us with a good deal of informationprocessing evidence from a thinner case. Given that the informationprocessing evidence subsumes the kind of evidence Dearborn and Simon collected, these differences are not problematic, but they should be noted just the same.
Finally, a review of Dearborn and Simon's results may indicate more similarity than dissimilarity to the present results. They published an appendix that reproduced the actual responses they received from their managers. A careful reading of those responses indicates that the sales managers identified sales, marketing, and organizational problems; the production managers identified organizational and sales problems; and the accounting managers identified problems in accounting, marketing, and organization. Ironically, it is not at all clear that Dearborn and Simon's data support their conclusionthe conclusion cited by so many subsequent researchers-that managers suffer from selective perception. Although the results of this conceptual replication of Dearborn and Simon's work largely contradict their own and everyone else's interpretation of their results, the actual results of the two studies do not appear to be contradictory.
Limitations and Future Research Needs
Several limitations of this investigation must be acknowledged. One limitation may be related to the content of the belief structure investigated. Although it is quite reasonable to propose the existence of a goal-oriented belief structure for organizational success, there may be other belief structures worthy of investigation. For example, studies could be conducted that would examine belief structures for organizational survival or organizational growth. The fact that 30 managers gave no individual dimension a weight greater than .60 and thus did not exhibit any firmly held orientation toward organizational success suggests that this study did not capture a relevant belief structure for those individuals.
In addition, the group-trait-space solution that emerged explained only 30 percent of the variance. It may be that the managers with no high dimension weights did hold a firm orientation to organizational success but that group-trait-space solution did not accurately represent their dissimilarity judgments. Future researchers should work to boost this variance-explained statistic to clarify whether respondents actually hold a particular belief structure.
Third, the participants in this study were all very successful managers selected by their organizations to earn an advanced degree in management. The results suggesting that these managers do not hold narrow belief structures or show evidence of simple-minded information processing may not generalize to managers with more modest accomplishments.
Fourth, the setting for the data collection triggers a number of concerns. Would the results hold in a pressured business environment? It may be that the tranquility and the denmand characteristics possibly inherent in a university setting prompted the managers to engage in more exhaustive information processing than normal. Moreover, their ability to invoke a crossfunctional perspective may reflect the fact that they learned their lessons well in the classroom. Away from the university setting, pressures of various kinds may produce a "threat-rigidity" response (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981: 502) in which managers act only on the most dominant dimensions of their belief structures. Finally, both Dearborn and Simon and I assumed that exposure to the activities of a particular department or function promotes the development of a belief structure or viewpoint that systematically affects managerial information processing. As I have speculated, many different kinds of exposure may promote such development, including direct and vicarious exposure and classroom experiences. The present evidence indicates that managers hold rather broadly focused belief structures, but it may be that political realities or other motivations may prompt a manager to act on a narrower, more self-interested set of dimensions. Although Dearborn and Simon's (1958) work is similarly limited, future research must examine the effects of managers' belief structures on information processing and decision making in field settings.
Additional research is also needed to examine the origins of belief structures and their relationship to decision environments. We need to know much more about how belief structures develop and change. The inconclusive relationships between direct work experience and belief-structure content reported here only fuel interest in this topic. Does vicarious learning contribute to the development of belief structures? Do groups and organizations instantiate belief structures, as Calder and Schurr (1981) Perhaps we have been too quick to attribute organizational maladies to the cognitive shortcomings of organizational decision makers. Defying scholarly concern about cognitive limitations and decision failures, the managers in this study did not emerge as simple-minded information processors. Nevertheless, it is still an open question whether or not such information processors can make simple-minded mistakes. The present research called attention to these issues, challenged researchers' perhaps simple-minded view of the simple-minded manager, suggested a set of refined research questions, and offered an accessible methodology for examining these issues in subsequent investigations.
